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Casenote
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS AND ABORTION.
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
Milan Vuitch, a licensed physician, was charged in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia with producing
and attempting to produce abortions in violation of the District of
Columbia abortion statute.1 Before trial Vuitch made a motion to
dismiss the indictment on the ground that the abortion law was
unconstitutionally vague.2 District Judge Gesell granted Vuitch's
motion and dismissed the indictment3 because the abortion law
failed to "give that certainty which due process of law considers
essential in a criminal statute.' 4 The United States immediately
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, asserting jurisdiction
under the Criminal Appeals Act.5
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,6 reversed the district
court's ruling, holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague in violation of due process.'
1 "Whoever, by means of any instrumnent, medicine, drug or other
means whatever, procures or produces an abortion or miscarriage on
any woman, unless the same were done as necessary for the preserva-
tion of the mother's life or health and under the direction of a com-
petent licensed practitioner of medicine, shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary not less than one year or not more than ten years ....
D.C. CODE § 22-201 (1953).
2 The primary phrase questioned was "necessary for the preservation of
the mother's life or health . .. ."
3 United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D.D.C. 1970).
4 Id. at 1034.
5 The Criminal Appeals Act allows direct appeals by the United States
from district court judgments "setting aside, or dismissing any in-
dictment or information, or any count thereof, where such decision or
judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute
upon which the indictment or information is founded." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1971). It was contended that the District of Columbia abortion
law was not a "statute" within the meaning of the Criminal Appeals
Act because the law applies only to the District of Columbia. The
majority of the Court said that the literal wording of the Act plainly
included the abortion statute, and the legislative history of the Act did
not show otherwise. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 65 (1971).
The majority did not decide whether the United States could have
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia instead
of directly to the Supreme Court.
6 The five-man majority granting jurisdiction split on the vagueness
question, as did the dissenters. Those in the majority on the vagueness
question were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black, Blackmun,
Harlan, and White.
7 402 U.S. at 71-72.
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On the merits, the majority followed a simple two-step process.
First, it held that the statute places the burden on the prosecution.
to plead and prove that the abortion was not necessary for thei
preservation of the mother's health or life.8 The district court,
relying on Williams v. United States,9 had ruled that once an abor-
tion was proved, the burden of persuading the jury that it was
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother was cast
upon the physician.10 The Supreme Court noted that such a reading
of the statute was erroneous, for there then would be grave consti-
tutional problems under the Fifth Amendment, and statutes should
be construed to uphold their constitutionality. Moreover, the dis-
trict court's construction of the abortion statute would contravene
the legislative desire that women be able to obtain abortions needed
for the preservation of their life or health.
Second, the majority held that the word "health" in the statute
was not so imprecise and uncertain that it failed to inform the
defendant of the charge against him." Therefore, the statute was
not violative of constitutional due process. The majority noted that
legislative history shed no light on the problem 2 and that no cases
prior to the district court decision discussed the problem.
However, while this case was being appealed, the issue was con-
sidered by the District Court for the District of Columbia in Doe v.
General Hospital.2 The abortion statute was there construed to
permit abortions for "mental health reasons whether or not the
patients had a previous history of mental defects,"'14 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia followed that
construction. 15 The United States Supreme Court accepted the con-
struction, noting that it conformed with common usage.16 The word
"health" was then not vague, nor was the statute. In fact, it was
pointed out that physicians 17 routinely decide in surgery whether
an operation is necessary for the health or life of the patient.',
8 Id.
9 78 App. D.C. 147, 138 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1943)
10 305 F. Supp. at 1034.
11 402 U.S. at 71-72.
12 The statute originally allowed abortions only to preserve the life of
the mother, but in 1901 the statute was amended to allow abortions
to preserve the health of the mother. There was no discussion of the
statutory change at the time of the amendment.
13 313 F. Supp. 1170 (D.D.C. 1970).
'4 Id. at 1174-75.
25 434 F.2d 423, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
16 402 U.S. at 72.
17 Throughout this discussion the terms "physicians" and "doctors" will
be used in their broadest sense (i.e., including psychiatrists, etc.).
18 402 U.S. at 72.
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The majority of the Court declined to consider contentions of
unconstitutional overbreadth' 9 based on Griswold v. Connecticut2
because the decision in the district court rested on the vagueness
ground only.
2'1
ABORTION STATUTES IN GENERAL
Abortion statutes usually prohibit all abortions and then exclude
special cases from the all-encompassing prohibition. However, abor-
tion statutes vary widely as to those instances when abortions are
allowed. The most restrictive statutes,22 of which Nebraska's is
typical, allow abortion only when necessary to preserve the life of
the woman.2 The term "life" in these statutes has been interpreted
as meaning only physical life, that is, the exception applies only
when without an abortion the woman's body would die. Arguments
that "life" includes "mental life" have failed in all instances.
24
19 The argument is that abortion statutes are unconstitutionally over-
broad because they infringe upon a woman's rights of liberty and
privacy. The Supreme Court is hearing arguments on this issue during
the present term.
20 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21 402 U.S. at 73.
22 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-29 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 301
(1953); FLA. STAT. §§ 782.10, 797. 01 (1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-601
(1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (Smith-Hurd 1970); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 10-105 (1956); IowA CODE ANN. § 701.1 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 436.020 (1962); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 51 (1965); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.14 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18 (1964); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 2223 (1967); Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.100 (1949); MONT. REV..
CODES ANN. § 94-401 (Repl. 1969); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-404, -405
(Reissue 19646); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 200.220, 201.120 (1963); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 585.12, .13 (1955); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-25-01 to -07
(1960); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 861 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-3-1 (1969); S.D. CODE
§ 13.3101 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-301, 302 (1956); TEx. PEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 1191-1196 (1961); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1 (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1956);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-8 (1967); Wis. STAT. § 940.04 (1963); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 6-77 (1959).
23 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-405 (Reissue 1964).
24 Cf. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1969). This is probably because the common meaning of the term
"life" is still physical life, not mental life. Moreover, most abortion
statutes were passed before knowledge of mental health was wide-
spread or accepted, hence, the legislatures undoubtedly meant only
physical life when passing abortion legislation. It has been urged
that "life" is composed of both physical and mental life, thus mental
life should be included.
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The Model Penal Code allows abortions performed by a licensed
physician if:
[H]e believes there is substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of
the mother or that the child would be born with grave physical or
mental defects, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest,
or other felonious intercourse.25
A few states have adopted some or all of the exceptions of the
Model Penal Code.26 The District of Columbia abortion statute
permits an abortion if the health or life of the mother would be
gravely impaired.2 7 However, the statute is not based on the Model
Penal Code.
28
Three states, Alaska, Hawaii and New York, have recently re-
pealed their abortion laws, and now require only that the abortion
be performed by a licensed physician.
In many states legislation has been introduced that would dras-
tically change the abortion statutes, and Nebraska is no exception.
In 1967 Senator Carpenter of Scottsbluff introduced L.B. 45 to the
77th Session of the Nebraska Unicameral. 30 As introduced, L.B. 45
would have allowed abortions if there existed a "substantial risk
that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the phy-
sical or mental health of the mother, or the pregnancy resulted from
rape by force . . . or from incest."31 Two other physicians would
have to certify that the abortion was necessary for the statutory
reason. The bill was amended to eliminate abortions because of
impairment of mental health.32 Subsequently, L.B. 45 was indefi-
nitely postponed, 3 and the present law was left standing with no
changes.
25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (2) (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962).
26 Arkansas: (1969) text and numbering not available, formerly ARx.
STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1964); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25951-25954
(1967); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-2-50 to 52 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. §§
26-1201, -1201 (1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4701 (1969); MD. ANN.
CODE § 43-149E (1967); N.M. STAT. Aim. §§ 40-A-5-1 to -a (1969);
ORE. REv. STAT. 435.405 - 435.990 (1953); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-82
to -84, -87 to -89 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18. 1-62 to 62.3 (1960).
27 D. C. CODE § 22-201 (1953).
28 The exception in the statute was inserted in 1901. W. ABERT, THE
COMPILED STATUTES IN FORCE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, C. XVI, at
158-159 (1894).
29 ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.0 0 (1962); HAwAu REV. LAWS § 453-1 (1959);
N.Y. PEN. LAws § 125.05 (McKinney 1967).
30 NEB. LEG. J., 77th Sess. 29 (1967).
31 Id. at 447-48.
32 Id. at 543.
33 Id. at 50.
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The" Supreme Court of Nebraska has had only three occasions to
interpret the Nebraska abortion statute, the last in 1946.-3 The
constitutionality of the statute has never been challenged.3 5
IMPLICATIONS OF VUITCH
One of the primary reasons for placing on the prosecution the
burden to plead and prove that the abortion was unnecessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother was to avoid constitutional
problems under the Fifth Amendment. Placing the burden of proof
of necessity on the defendant after the act of an abortion is proved
amounts to a presumption that the abortion was not necessary. In
Tot v. United States"6 the test of constitutionality of penal statutory
presumptions under the Fifth Amendment was set out:
A statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact pre-
sumed, if the inference of the one from the proof of the other is
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in com-
mon experience.87
The fact that the defendant has the better means of obtaining in-
formation does not justify placing on him the burden of going
forward with the evidence.8 8 In Leary v. United States"9 the same
test was employed.40 The Court in Leary went on to state that
great weight must be given legislative determinations, 41 but if a
presumption is "highly empirical," available pertinent material
must be canvassed to insure the validity of the factual presump-
tion.42 Moreover, the reviewing tribunal must inspect not only the
data available at the time the statute was passed, but also recent
34 Hans v. State, 147 Neb. 730, 25 N.W.2d 35 (1946); Rice v. State, 120
Neb. 641, 234 N.W. 566 (1931);'Edwards v. State, 79 Neb. 251, 112 N.W.
11 (1907).
35 Nebraska also has a foeticide statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-404 (Reissue
1964), which differs from the abortion statute in two ways: (1) the
foeticide statute involves only pregnant women with vitalized fetuses;
(2) the intent required is to kill the fetus, not to cause a miscarriage.
The foeticide statute has been challenged on constitutional grounds
and has been held valid, but a vagueness argument was not urged.
Hans v. State, 147 Neb. 7, 22 N.W.2d 385 (1946).
86 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
37 Id. at 467-68.
88 Id. at 469.
39 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
40 Id. at 36.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 38.
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information.43 It seems that a paucity of substantiating information
at either time would invalidate the statute.44
Several problems concerning present abortion statutes thus be-
come evident.45 First, the Supreme Court in Vuitch plainly inti-
mates that the presumption of guilt in the abortion statute is not
rationally connected to the proof of an abortion.46 Undoubtedly, all
abortion statutes presuming a defendant guilty after proof of an
abortion would fail to meet the Tot and Leary test. Moreover, in
most cases a state supreme court would not be able to put a vali-
dating gloss on the state abortion statute for most attacks on
abortion statutes are made in federal courts. Since federal courts
are bound by state supreme court constructions of state statutes,47
any state abortion statute which by its terms or by state judicial
decisions presumes a defendant guilty after proof of an abortion
would undoubtedly violate the Fifth Amendment.
Nebraska's abortion statute has been interpreted as requiring
the prosecution to prove that the abortion was not necessary to
preserve the life of the mother.48 However, the other' part of the
disjunctive exculpatory clause of the abortion statute49 might be
a problem. No decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska has spe-
cifically discussed whether the prosecution must prove that two
43 Id.
44 Insufficient data at the time of passage would seem to render the act
void in the inception, and hence, void today; insufficient data at the
present would render the statute void at the present although valid
when passed. Id. at 38, 53-54.
45 It should be noted that abortion statutes are penal statutes and, as
such, all elements of criminal law are necessary and relevant. This
should be kept in mind in the ensuing discussion, particularly in re-
gard to the burden of proof.
46 402 U.S. at 70.
47 Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of the
weight to be given state court constructions and interpretations see
C. WRiGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTs § 58 (1970).
48 Rice v. State, 120 Neb. 641, 234 N.W. 566 (1931).
-9 "[Or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for
that purpose . . . . " NEB; REv. STAT. § 28-405 (Reissue 1964). The
Supreme Court of Nebraska has indicated that the prosecution must
plead that the defendant was not advised by two physicians. Rice v.
State, 120 Neb. 641, 647, 234 N.W. 566, 569 (1931). The court impliedly
accepts as correct a trial court instruction that the prosecution must
prove that the defendant does not fall under either of the exculpatory
clauses, but, in the next paragraph, the majority intimates that the
defendant had claimed he fell under the exculpatory clauses, so the
instruction is probably based on the facts of the case (i.e., an asserted
defense) and not on the statute.
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physicians did not in fact certify that the abortion was necessary.50
However, the Nebraska abortion statute was copied from the Ohio
abortion statute,51 and that law has been interpreted as requiring
only that the prosecution prove the abortion not necessary, the bur-
den then shifting to the defense to prove that two physicians certi-
fied the abortion as being necessary.52 It is highly probable that Ne-
braska state courts have followed this interpretation. 53 If so, a consti-
tutional problem would be present for the statute must be taken at
face value,54 and this would mean that proof of an abortion would
imply a lack of certification of necessity by two physicians. It is
irrelevant that a proven lack of necessity would imply lack of
certification of necessity. The act prohibited by the statute is the
abortion, and the abortion is the fact which must imply lack of
certification. It could be argued that the basic fact prohibited is an
unnecessary abortion, and proof of that gives rise to an inference
that a certification of necessity was not obtained. This argument
strains the wording of the statutes too much. Thus, if the Nebraska
abortion statute does not require the prosecution to plead and prove
that the abortion was not certified by two physicians as necessary
to preserve the life of the mother, it is probably violative of the
Fifth Amendment and, hence, unconstitutional.
It is pointed out by the majority in Vuitch that when an excep-
tion is in the enacting clause, the burden is on the prosecution to
plead and prove that the defendant does not fall in any of the
exceptions.55 A few states have exceptions to their abortion statutes
in separate sections or statutes.5 6 These statutes ostensibly are not
affected by the burden of proof rule of Vuitch. However, by the
weight of authority, when evidence appears which tends to bring
the defendant within an exception not contained in the enacting
clause, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to overcome
that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.5 7 The Supreme Court
clearly felt that proof of an abortion does not imply the abortion
50 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-404 (Reissue 1964).
51 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.1 (1953).
52 Moody v. State, 17 Ohio St. 110 (1886).
53 See cases cited and discussion at notes 35 and 50 supra.
54 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 37 (1969).
55 402 U.S. at 70.
56 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2-50 to -52 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. §§
26-1201,-1202 (1970); LA. REV. STAT. § 14.87 (1951), § 37.1285 (1964);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 585.12, .13 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
40-A-5-1 to -3 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-82 to -84, -87 to -89
(1962); TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 1191-96 (1961).
57 F. WHARTON, CIMINAL EVIDENCE § 20 (12th ed. 1955).
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was not necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.5
In fact, buttressed by the high esteem afforded the medical profes-
sion, proof of an abortion undoubtedly implies that the abortion
was necessary. Thus proof of an abortion, a requisite for conviction
under any abortion statute, automatically brings the accused physi-
cian within the statutory exception of necessity. Therefore, even
in those abortion statutes not containing the exceptions in the
enacting clause, the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant does not fall under any
exceptions of necessity.
Requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant does not fall under any of the exceptions of the
applicable abortion statutes59 places a very heavy burden of proof
on the state. It is very difficult to prove a doctor's prognosis in-
correct for the attending physician knows the peculiar details of
the patient's health, and other physicians are extremely reluctant
to second-guess their colleagues.60 The more exceptions there are
in the statute, the more difficult the burden becomes. The criteria
for some exceptions' 1 are so physically unascertainable that proof
is effectively precluded in all but the most flagrant cases. A re-
deeming factor for the prosecution is that circumstantial evidence
can be sufficient to convict a defendant, 62 and because statutory
exceptions often overlap to some degree, the same evidence might
be used to prove the defendant does not fall under several statutory
exceptions.63 This is most obvious where certification by two physi-
cians that an abortion is legally necessary is a statutory exception.64
Proof of the non-existence of the substantive exception (the neces-
sity of the abortion for some reason) strongly implies lack of certifi-
cation of necessity for that exception. Therefore, although a much
heavier evidentiary burden is probably cast on the prosecution in
58 402 U.S. at 70.
59 Id.
60 This is very apparent in medical malpractice tort cases. Physicians will
understandably be more reluctant to testify in abortion cases where
the penalty is imprisonment and not merely damages.
61 For example, one common exception is to preserve the mental health
of the mother.
62 As long as guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Rice v.
State, 120 Neb. 641, 647, 234 N.W. 566, 569 (1931). See also F. WHAIToN,
CSnuAL EviENC. § 12 (12th ed. 1955).
63 For example, the Model Penal Code allows abortions for, inter alia,
incest, rape or felonious intercourse. Simply proving that the father
of the child was the woman's husband would preclude exculpation
under these exceptions. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Prop. Off. Draft,
1962).
64 NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-405 (Reissue 1964).
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many states because of Vuitch, it is not an impossible burden, and
in some states (e.g., Nebraska) the burden is essentially the same
as before Vuitch.
The problem of the vagueness of the words in present abortion
statutes was not resolved with finality in the Vuitch majority
opinion. However, what the majority did not say but seemed to
assume is important. The district court's interpretation of the
word "health" was not definitive but was accepted as sufficient for
due process. Apparently, the majority felt a strong presumption of
validity was present. The defendant could not have known of the
true meaning of the statute until the subsequent decision of the
district court interpreted the statute, so Dr. Vuitch could not have
had notice of the applicable test to ascertain guilt.65 Moreover, al-
though abortions under the word "health" are allowed for mental
health reasons, just what mental health reasons fall under the ex-
ception were never mentioned,66 hence the applicable statutory test
of guilt is still uncertain.
67
Two major implications of the majority's position arise. First,
the majority was willing to give the word "health" a broad meaning,
at least to the extent of including mental health.6 They noted that
this interpretation conformed to present common usage. In constru-
ing abortion statutes, state supreme courts can undoubtedly turn
to the present usage of various terms if strong evidence of legisla-
tive intent is lacking. Moreover, since the Supreme Court was quite
willing to accept a liberal interpretation of the word "health," might
not a similar interpretation be applicable to the word "life?" Could
not "life" include both physical and mental life? That is, if a statute
allows an abortion only to preserve the "life" of the mother, would
an abortion be allowable if there were a good chance that requiring
65 Vagueness in regard to the applicable test to ascertain guilt has in the
past been a ground for holding the statute violative of the due process
clause. Winter v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948); Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
66 402 U.S. at 74, 75-76. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
67 See note 65 supra.
68 An indication of how the expert medical testimony (relating to the
criteria for granting abortions for mental health reasons) might be
handled by the trial court is found in the progression of cases in-
volving the criteria for the insanity defense in the District of Columbia.
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Carter v.
United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959); McDonald v. United
States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Washington v. United States,
390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (and the appendix to the opinion con-
cerning the court's instruction to expert witnesses in cases involving
the defense of insanity).
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the mother to carry the child to full term would so affect her
mentally that she would have to be hospitalized in a mental institu-
tion the rest of her life? It is a definite possibility which might find
favor with some courts.
Second, a very important implication of the majority opinion is
the presumption of correctness to be afforded a physician's diagnosis.
Much concern is expressed about protecting doctors and encouraging
them to act without fear of prosecution.69 The criteria of legally
sufficient mental health reasons for abortions are to be determined
by doctors, the majority noting that doctors routinely make such
decisions.70 The overall thrust of the opinion indicates extreme re-
luctance to second-guess physicians, and ways to protect doctors
from vengeful juries are pointed outY1 Practically, the majority has
almost completely accepted the formulation of the statute suggested
by Mr. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion:
[T]he question of whether the performance of an abortion is "neces-
sary for the mother's life or health" is entrusted under the statute
exclusively to those licensed to practice medicine.... A competent
licensed practitioner of medicine is wholly immune from being
charged with the commission of a criminal offense under this
law.72
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
A primary basis of People v. Belous 73 the progenitor of recent
abortion litigation, is that giving doctors so much discretion would
be an improper delegation of legislative power to a person with a
direct, pecuniary and substantial interest in the outcome of the
decision and would therefore violate due process.74
The doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
has not had a dramatic history. Although apparently dormant for
federal statutes,7 5 the rule is still used to invalidate statutes and
ordinances under state constitutions.7 6 At present, the judicial
69 402 U.S. at 70-71.
70 Id. at 72.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1312.
78 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
74 Id. at 972-73, 458 P.2d at 203-05, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
75 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936) (alternative hold-
ing), which is questionable law at best, is the most recent example.
Compare Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 54 (1963).
78 E.g., State v. Bruton, 246 Ark. 288, 437 S.W.2d 795 (1969). Cf. K. DAvis,
AD n~nsA.mvE LAw § 2.07 (1958); Note, The State Courts and Dele-
gation of Public Authority to Private Groups, 67 HARv. L. Rav. 1398
(1954).
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attitude seems to be that the legislature has the authority to
delegate its powers,77 but due process requirements must be ful-
filled in the authorized rule-making of the delegate. 78 Bearing in
mind that the state statute must meet strict requirements, a few
special due process requisites should be noted. Stringent require-
ments are demanded if a private individual or group is delegated
power instead of a public official, 79 if the private individual or group
has a self-interest in the determination it has to make" and espe-
cially if a penal statute is involved.8 '
By allowing doctors to determine the criteria for allowing abor-
tions for mental health reasons the legislature has given rule-making
power to a private group not responsible to the voting public. More-
over, the statute involved is penal and the medical profession has
a definite interest in the criteria to be determined for (1) doctors
are the individuals subject to the statute involved, (2) the indi-
vidual physician is involved in the drama of the pregnant woman's
plight and (3) the performance of an abortion is a means of pro-
ducing income.
Analogies to medical evidence in insanity defenses and malprac-
tice cases are not applicable for several reasons. When establishing
criteria for insanity defenses doctors are not personally interested
in or affected by the criteria established. Moreover, in most states
the criteria are not controlling since they are only "opinions." In
the malpractice cases no penal statute is involved and there are
physical criteria available for the jury to assess when considering
the weight to be afforded expert medical testimony. Hence, dele-
gating to the doctor or the medical profession the authority to
decide what shall and what shall not be an infringement of an
abortion statute is probably violative of constitutional due process.
However, the majority in Vuitch does not even mention the prob-
lem.
77 Usually this is considered under some type of "necessary and proper"
clause.
78 K. DAvis, ADmISTRATiVE LAW § 2.00-6 (Supp. 1971).
79 Group Health Ins. of New Jersey v. Howell, 40 N.J. 43, 445, 193 A.2d
103, 108 (1963). The rationale behind such a holding is that private
individuals and groups, unlike public officials, are not held directly
accountable by the electorate.
80 Id. at 446, 193 A.2d at 109. See also Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116
Utah 422, 428, 211 F.2d 196, 199 (1949).
81 See Arkansas v. Bruton, 24 Ark. 288, 437 S.W.2d 795 (1969). Compare
Wycoff Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 283,
cert. denied 371 U.S. 819 (1962).
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The door is opened by the majority to allow doctors much greater
freedom in practicing medicine. In effect, doctors are told to prac-
tice as they see fit, and only the obvious cases of malpractice will
be questioned. Thus, if one is a doctor, he has greater protection
under some laws than non-physicians. The spectre of equal pro-
tection problems is probably skirted by arguing that giving doctors
special favors in the abortion area is a legitimate rational classifica-
tion and hence constitutional.82 Perhaps this is indicative of the
approach the Supreme Court will take if and when other cases in-
volving doctors and their practice reach the Supreme Court.
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CONCLUSION
The majority in Vuitch further delineated and illustrated the
requirements of due process, considering the presumption of guilt
raised by the District of Columbia abortion statute and the resulting
burden of proof of non-necessity which was placed on the prosecu-
tion. Commendably, the broader constitutional question raised by
GriswoZd did not affect the majority. Although the majority found
the statute constitutional, they did liberally construe it by allowing
abortions for mental health reasons, obviously adopting a middle-
of-the-road approach to a raging social issue. However, the medical
profession was indirectly given much power, and only time will tell
whether the faith placed in the medical profession was well-
founded.
John Wagner '73
82 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Kotch v. Board of River Port
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
83 For example, mercy killing and the multitudinous problems sur-
rounding the transplanting of vital organs.
